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I. INTRODUCTION 
Copyright law affects 
librarie in many ways. It 
protects the core activities 
of most libraries - collecting ~~~~~~~~~~~::::::=========-.:._..:. ___ __, 
Authors . . . the exclusive 
Right to their respective 
Writings" to "promote the 
Progress of Science and 
useful Arts."; In 1976, 
Congress concluded more information resources and 
making them available to the public. This is no small 
accomplishment. Other countries (for example, Great 
Britain) charge a royalty every time a library loans a 
book. 1 opyright Jaw protects the original expression 
of librarians and library staff, and helps clarify which 
rights belong to the library and which to the individual 
creators. Although copyright law is generally highly 
protective of the interests of libraries, it al o provides 
for liability when libraries, or in some ca. es ilieir 
employees or even their patron , infringe the copy-
rights of others. 
The proliferation of the Internet and other digital 
te hnologies has expanded the importance of copy-
right law not only to libraries, but to virtually every 
egmcnt of U.S. society. As statutes, judicial opinion~, 
and legal holarship race to adapt to this technologtcal 
hangc, the application of copyright law has become 
both more complex and more uncertain. Again, 
libraries may be especially vulnerable to this complexity 
and uncertainty because many libraries both use and 
make ava ilable to th public technologies - photocopi-
ers, videotape and elise players and recorders, net-
worked computer , tape recorders, online database , 
CD-ROMs fa simile machines - each one of which has 
among its primary u es the infringement of copyrighted 
w rks . 
Congres rook its first step towards addressing d1is 
situation in October 1998 when it passed the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) .2 The Act creates 
signill ant new rights for copyright holders and new 
d ·f ·n cs for opyright users, both of which are poten-
tia lly riti al to the activities of most libraries. This 
arti 1c provides a brief overview of the current state of 
U .. copyright law and a summary of me DMCA's recent 
·hange to that law that are likely to affect libraries. 
II. OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
opyright law in the Uni ted States is based on me 
opyright Clau e in the U.S. Constitution, which 
mpower Congress to "secur[ e] tor limited Times to 
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than a decade of bearings and debate by passing a new 
Copyright Act that substantially rewrote · .. copyright 
law! Under the prior law, which had been enacted in 
1909,~ federal copyright protection applied only to 
limited categories of works and then only if the work 
was published;6 required strict compliance wid1 a 
variety of formalities, including registration with me 
Copyright Office and publication with appropriate 
copyright notice/ and lasted for only 28 years (56 
years, if the copyright was renewed).~ 
The 1976 Act substantially broadened and extended 
federal copyright protection . Rather than protecting 
only specified categories of works, Congress app lied 
copyright law to all works of authorship ,9 provided that 
they were "ftxed " and "original," regardless of whether 
they were published. A work is "f'Lxed" when it is 
embodied, by or with the permission of its creator, in 
"any tangible medium of expression" from which the 
work can be "perceived, reproduced or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aiel of a 
machine or device ... for a period of more than 
transitory duration." 11J A work may be fLXecl on paper, 
videotape, disk, or on many oilier forms of media, but 
not on a television or computer screen because d1ese 
images are of only "transitory duration." A work is 
"original" if it is "independently created by the author 
(as opposed to copied from other works) , and .. . 
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity." 11 
These requirements are deliberately broad and easy to 
satisfy. As a result, copyright law now protects every 
letter, memo, note, home video, answering machine 
message, e-mail, and doodle. 
Moreover, unlike other areas of intellectual 
property, the 1976 Act, as amended in 1988 12 and again 
in 1998,13 does not require compliance wid1 statutory 
formalities or application to d1e government as a 
condition for protection. 1" Protection begins as soon as 
the work is "fLXecl" - whether or not the author wishes 
the work to be protected - and lasts for 70 years past 
the life of the author. 1 ~ If the author is an organization, 
protection lasts for 120 years after creation or 95 years 
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after publication, whichever expires first. 16 nder 
current copyright law, protection is easy to come by, 
long-lasting, and difficult to lose. 
The rights protected under current law are equally 
expansive. Copyright law gives a creator, or, in some 
circumstances, a creator's employer, 17 five exclu ive 
rights: the right to reproduce, adapt distribute, 
publicly perform, and publicly display a copyrighted 
work. 18 For the period covered by the copyright, the 
law permits only the copyright holder to engage in, or 
authorize someone else to engage in, any activity 
covered by the five exclusive rights. In addition, the 
1976 Act grants to the copyright owner the right to 
control importation of copyrighted works into the 
United States. 19 
The exclusive rights may be transferred or licensed 
individually or collectively, for use by others.~l1 Trans- ' 
fers and exclusive licenses must be in writing; nonex-
clusive licenses may be granted orally or even im-
plied.2' The transferee or exclusive licensee is entitled 
"to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and 
remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this 
title."22 The new copyright holder or exclusive licensee 
can enforce his or her rights against even the original 
creator or copyright holder.2·1 
Courts have interpreted copyright law's infringe-
ment provisions very broadly. Individuals and institu-
tions are liable nor only for their own conduct, but also 
for the conduct of emp loyees (under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior~•); the conduct of anyone whom 
they supervise and in whose work they have a financial 
interest (vicarious infringement); 25 and the conduct of 
anybody whose infringing activity they knowingly 
induce, cause, or to which they materially contribute 
(contributory infringement).2~ Libraries run the risk of 
liability- if their conduct is not protected by a statutory 
defense, discussed below- under contributory infringe-
ment when they provide patrons with botb copyrighted 
material (e.g. , books) and access to the means for 
copying that material (e.g. , a photocopier) , with 
knowledge that patrons will likely use the latter to 
infringe the copyright in the former . The law does not 
require that the defendant intend to infringe, or, 
except in the case of contributory infringement, even 
have knowledge of the infringing conduct. Innocent 
intent or lack of knowledge may affect damages , but 
they do nor affect liability.n 
The 1976 Act provides significant penalties for 
violating the exclusive rights, including injunctions,28 
impoundment and destruction of infri nging copies,29 
actual damages and lost profits,~0 statutory damages/ ' 
court costs,:\2 and attorneys' fees.~3 The Act also pro-
vides criminal penalties for "[a]ny person who infringes 
a copyright willfully and for purposes of commercial 
advantage or private financial gain."3• 
Although broad copyright protection in the nited 
States is not limitles . The most significant limit in 
copyright today is that t11e law protect expre sion 
only. o matter how original or creative, "[i]n no ca e 
does copyright protection for an original ork of 
authorship e>-'tend to any id a, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation concept principle or 
discovery, regardle of the form in which it i d -
scribed eA"J)lained illu trated or embodied in uch 
work."5' In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Company, a unanimous upreme Court 
stressed : "The mo t fundamental axiom of copyright 
law is that '[n]o author may copyright his idea or the 
facts he narrate . . . .' (C]opyright assure authors the 
right to their original e..xpression but n ourages 
others to build freely upon the idea and information 
conveyed by a work. "5~ 
As a result courts will not protect expres i n if it 
includes one of a limited number of ways of conveying 
an id a concept or fact, or if it is nece sa.ry to imp! -
menting an idea or concept. nder the doctrine of 
"merger,'' courts withhold copyright prot ction from 
original tlxed expre · ion if t11at e..xprcs · ion "must 
necessarily be u eel as incident to" the work's under-
lying ideas or data. ' In that ituation, courts tlnd that 
t11e expression and t11e underlying idea or fact have 
"merged."5H The doctrine of merger highlights the 
importance of preventing copyright law from ever 
protecting a fact or idea: it is preferable to exclude 
otherwise prorectable expression from copyright la,v's 
monopoly rather than to allow that monopoly ro 
e>-'tend to any fact or idea. 
Copyright protection is al o subject to four other 
signitkant limitations relevant to librari s. The "first 
sale" doctrine codified in ection 109 /~ limits copy-
right owners ' rights by subjecting nly th initial 
distribution of a particular copy of a copyright d work 
ro their control. The first sale do trine provicl s rhat 
once the copyright holder has distributed or autho-
rized the distribution of opies of her opyrighted 
work, subsequent possessors of those c pies may 
redistribute them without the copyright holder's 
permission. '" Without the first sale doctrine, reselling, 
lending, or giving away a copy of a copyrighted work 
would violate the copyright holder's exclusive distri-
bution right. -' 1 The first sale doctrine is therefore 
particularly important to libraries . 
Copyright law also includes specific exemptions 
from the exclusive rights to publicly display and 
perform copyrighted works. Section 109 exempts the 
public display of a lawful copy of a copyrighted work 
by its rightful owner. 2 Without this exemption, it 
would be a violation of the copyright law to publicly 
display a photograph, painting, or other copyrighted 
work without the permission of the copyright owner. 
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This exemption applies whether the display is direct 
(e.g., hanging the painting) or by projection of no 
more than one image at a time (e.g., showing slides of 
one or more paintings in series). However, the viewers 
must be "present at the place where the copy is lo-
cated."H Again, because this provision permits the 
public display of book jackets and other copyrighted 
material, it is important to libraries. 
"Fair use" constitutes a statutory defense to copy-
right infringement. According to the 1976 Act, certain 
u e of copyrighted works may be fair "for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, reaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom u e), scholar-
ship, or research ."·•·' Fair use expressly permits certain 
uses of copyrighted works that serve important public 
purpo es and that do nor harm the market for the 
original work. The Act sets out four factors for courts to 
consider when determining whether an otherwise 
infringing u e is fair:s Courts often focu on the fourth 
factor: "the effect of the use upon the potential tor or 
value of the copyrighted work."46 According to the 
Supreme Court, unauthorized uses of copyrighted 
works are unfair (1) if it is proved that the particular 
use is harmful to the market for the original work, or 
(2) if it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence 
that "should [the use] become "videspread, it would 
adversely affect the potential market for the copyright-
ed work."''7 Fair use immunizes activities such as 
quoting portions of a book or song in a review; its 
value ro libraries is clear. 
Finally, Section 108 provides for defense specifi-
cally applicable to libraries. Section 108 esrabli hes 
certain "safe harbors" - situations in which libraries and 
archive and their patrons may reproduce and distrib-
ute copies of copyrighted works without infringing. 
This provi ion permit limited photocopying of books 
and periodicals for scholarly or archival purposes as 
long as the opying is neither systematic nor a substi-
tute tor purchase or subscription.4ij To qualify, a library 
or archives must make its collections available to the 
public or to unaffiliated persons doing research in 
appropriate fields. '9 Moreover, the reproduction or 
distribution must be made without direct or indirect 
ommercial advantage. St' ection 108 also permits 
interlibrary loan photocopying "of no more than one 
article or orb r ontriburion ro a copyrighted collec-
tion or periodi al is ue " or "a small part of any other 
copyrighted work," subject to important limitationsY 
Finally, Section 108 appears to absolve libraries and 
library employees for infringement resulting from "the 
unsupervi ed use of reproducing equipment located 
on it premi es," provided that "such equipment 
eli plays a notice that the making of a copy may be 
subject to the copyright law."~2 
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Ill. DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 
The DMCA creates important new rights for both 
copyright holders and users. Although intended to 
resolve issues presented by digital technologies, the 
DMCA has considerably broader impact. It is a complex 
piece of legislation consisting of five titles, only three 
of which are relevant to the activities of libraries. 
A. Title I - WIPO Treaties Implementation 
Title I of the DMCA implements two World Intellec-
tual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties: The \XIIPO 
Copyright Treaty and The \XIIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, adopted at the \XIIPO Diplomatic 
Conference in December 1996. Those treaties require 
member nations to protect digitally transmitted works 
in two ways: 
(1) to provide legal remedies against the circum-
vention of technological measures designed to block 
access to copyrighted works and 
(2) to prohibit the interference witl1 copyright 
management information digitally encoded in copy-
righted works, including information about copyright 
ownership and licensing terms. 
1. Anti-Circumvention 
The Act achieves the first purpose by adding 
Section 1201 to the copyright law. The new section 
prohibits the circumvention of technological measures 
taken by copyright owners to control access to t11eir 
works or to prevent the unauthorized exercise of the 
copyright owner's exclusive rights . Section 1201(a) 
applies to circumvention for tl1e purpose of obtaining 
access to a work, and prohibits both circumventing 
technological measures that impede access and 
"manufactur(ing] , import[ing], offer[ing] to tl1e public, 
provid(ing], or otherwise traffic(ingj in any technol-
ogy, product, sen>ice, device, component, or part 
thereof' that is primarily designed to circumvent 
technological measures designed to control access to a 
work.B 
This provision takes effect two years after enact-
ment of tl1e DMCA, on October 28, 2000. During this 
two-year period, the Librarian of Congress is to con-
duct a rulemaking proceeding to evaluate the impact of 
the prohibition against the act of circumventing the 
acces control measures set forth in the Act.~., 
Congress recognized legitimate reasons tor engag-
ing in circumvention. Accordingly, Title I specifically 
provides for one broad and six specific exceptions to 
the prohibition on circumvention and circumvention 
devices.s~ One is specifically applicable to nonprofit 
libraries. Section 1201(d) provides an exemption for 
nonprofit libraries, arcl1ives, and educational institu-
tions to gain access to commercially exploited copy-
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righted works solely to make a good faith determina-
tion of whether to acquire the work. The exemption 
applies only if a qualifying institution cannot obtain a 
copy of the .work by other means. 5f' 
2 . Copyright Management Information 
Section 1202 of the DMCA prohibit altering 
"copyright management information" (CMI) and creates 
liability for any person who provides or distributes fal e 
CMP In addition, the Act prohibits the intentional 
removal or alteration of CM1, and its kno·wing distribu-
tion in altered form. 5s "CMI" includes all identifying 
infom1ation involving the author or performer, the 
terms and conditions for the use of the work, and 
other information such as embedded pointers and 
hypertext links. 59 These provisions respond to the use 
of digital technologies' ability to encode significant 
amounts of data, whicl1 can be used to identity the 
copyright owner and to facilitate the licensing of 
copyrighted works. Pertinent information such a 
name and addres , telephone number, fax number, e-
mail address, and licensing rates, can be encoded into 
the work and displayed to a potential cu stomer. For 
works available over digital networks, embedded links 
to the copyright owner can make electronic licensing 
even more convenient. As more and more works 
become available in electronic form , this information 
cou ld sign ificantly reduce the transaction costs associ-
ated with copyright licensing and greatly enhance 
enforcement of copyright laws. 
The DMCA creates civi l remedies and criminal 
penalties for violations of Sections 1201 and 1202.(>0 
The Act provides for statutory damages of as great as 
$2 ,500 per act of circumvention, and up to $25,000 for 
each violation of the CMI provisions.6 1 The Act gives 
courts wide discretion to grant injunctions and award 
dan1ages, costs, and attorney's fees, and also to reduce 
damage awards against innocent violators. c.z For non-
profit libraries, archives, or educational institutions, 
however, courts must remit damages if they find that 
the violator had no reason to know of the violation63 
In addition, criminal penalties do not apply to non-
profit libraries, arcl1ives, and educational institutions .c'"' 
The new CMI provisions raise many concerns that 
have yet to be resolved by courts. Although targeted at 
copyright-related information imbedded in digital files , 
the provisions are not limited to electronic works. To 
be covered by the Act, the CMI must be conveyed with 
a copyrighted work.65 As a result, these new provisions 
would prohibit removing or altering information about 
the creator, copyright, license terms, and the like 
concerning any copyrighted work. Arguably, this 
extends not only to reproducing a copyrighted work, 
bur to any use made of such a work, for example, a 
quote in a review. Including all of the original work's 
CMI in such a situation will likely prove cumbersome 
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or even impossible. Moreover, tl1ere is no indication in 
the DMCA that the CMI provi ions are subject to fair 
use or other defenses. Finally, the damages for violat-
ing CMI provisions - 25,000 for each violation - are 
considerable. Taken together, the e factor lead to th 
fear that copyright holders will sue pos ible infringers 
in the future not for their alleged infringement (which 
is often difficult and time-consuming to prove) but 
rather for violating the CMI provision . Although 
libraries are exempt from criminal penaltie and face 
reduced civil dan1age if they had no reason to know 
that they were removing CMI, the potential threat f 
significant and easy-to-obtain dan1ages under the CMI 
provision is neverth 1 ss significant. 
B. Title II - Online Copyright Infringement Liability 
Limitation 
The DMCA include important new provision 
applicable ro "online service provider " (0 Ps) . Al-
though few libraries might think of th mselves as 0 Ps, 
the law defines the t rm very broadly as "a provider of 
online services or network access, or the operator f 
facilities therefor."66 Becau e some libraries do provid 
Internet acces e-mail, chat room , web page hosting, 
and otl1er transmission routing, and conn tion 
services, and more are likely to do so in the future a 
brief summary of th 0 P provisions is warranted. 
However, the OSP provisions are d railed and techni-
cal, so it i on ly possibl to provide a broad overview 
below. 
Prior to enactment of the DM A, som court had 
found that OSPs were liable - both directly and con-
tributorily - for tl1e infringing conduct of t11e users of 
their services.67 Title II of the DM A limits 0 P liability 
in tl1ree important situations , discussed below. Begin-
ning on Octob r 28, 1998, these exemptions from 
liability add to any defense that an 0 P might have 
under copyright Ia\¥. These e..xemptions do not consti-
tute complete defenses to copyright inf ringement suits. 
Ratl1er, they eliminate the availabi li ty of monetary 
damages, and redu e the situations in which injun -
tions may be granted. 
1. Transmission and Routing- ection 512 (a) 
Title II of the DMCA insulate 1lll 0 P from liability 
when it is merely acting as a passive conduit for 
materials passing between other parrics. c>li This provi-
sion applies only if the following concliti ns are met: 
(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by 
or at the direction of a person other than the service 
provider; 
(2) the transmission, routing, provision of connec-
tions, or storage is carried out through an automatic 
technical process without selection of the mate rial by 
the service provider; 
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(3) the service provider does not select the recipi-
ents of the mate rial except as an automatic response to 
the request of another person; 
(4) no copy of the material made by the service 
provider in the course of such intermediate or tran-
sient srorage is maintained on the system or network in 
a manne r ord inarily acce sible to anyone other than 
anticipated recipients, and no such copy is maintained 
on the system or network in a manner ordinarily 
acce sible ro uch anticipated recipients for a longer 
period than is reasonably nece sary for the transmis-
sio n, routing, o r provision of connections; and 
(5) the mate ri al is transmitted through the system 
or network without modification of its content.69 
Collectively, these conditions require that the role 
of the 0 P is entirely passive towards the allegedly 
infringed material. 
2 . ystem Caching - Section 512 (b) 
Virtually all networked computers "cache" docu-
ments - that is, they store a copy of the document on 
the hard drive for faster reference in the future. This 
allows compute rs ro manage large files and also ro 
provide for speedier access to commonly used or 
recently used documents. Since caching necessarily 
involves making a copy of a file, it would like ly consti-
nlt(; copyright infringe ment. The DMCA provides that 
caching i · no r copyright infringement, provided that 
the OSP is nor it ell' downloading material for storage 
or altering the content of cached material, and that the 
OSP complies with industry standards related to 
caching.'o 
3. Storing and Linking- Section 512(c)-(d) 
Finally, Title II of the DMCA limits OSP liability 
under the copyright law for two common OSP activi-
ties: (1) storing material, such a a web page, on a 
serv r; ' 1 and (2) r ferring users ro material at other 
o nline sires through hypertext links.72 The former 
wou ld clearly con ritute copyright infringement, absent 
the defense provided by the OMCA, because it involves 
reproducing (as well as, pe rhap , publicly displaying) 
copyrighted material. It is un etrled whether merely 
lin king to a ite could constitute copyright infringe-
m ·nr, r whether the operator of a web page could be 
onrriburorily liable for linking to another page that 
ontain ·cl infringing material. Fortunately, this provi-
sion of the DMCA makes the resolution of those issues 
unnecessary. The Act limits Liability based on the 
material be ing rored or referred to if the OSP meets 
rh following conditions: 
(1) does not have actual knowledge that the 
mat rial or an activity using the material on the system 
r network is infringing· 
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(2) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not 
aware of facts or circum ranees from which infringing 
activity is apparent; 
(3) upon obtaining such knowledge or awarenes , 
acts expeditiou ly to remove, or disable access to the 
material; 
(4) does not receive a financial benefit directly 
attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which 
the service provider has the right and ability to control 
such activity; and 
(5) upon notification of claimed infringement . . . 
responds expeditiously to re move, or disable access to, 
the material that is claimed to be inJringing or to be tl1e 
subject of infringing activity.73 
4. Threshold Conditions 
To qualify for any of the exemptions in Title II, an 
OSP must meet three general conditions. First, it must 
adopt, implement, and inform its subscribers and 
account holders of irs policy providing for termination 
of users who are repeat infringers. 74 Second, the 0 P 
must accommodate and not interfere with "standard 
technical measures" used by copyright owners to 
identify and protect copyrighted works.7~ Third, an 0 P 
must comply with th e DMCA's "notice and takedown 
provisions." These provisions are covered in minute 
detail in the OMCA, but tl1ey basically require tl1at the 
OSP (1) designate an agent to receive notifications of 
claimed copyright infringement, and (2) provide 
publicly (including on the 0 P's web site) the name, 
address, phone number, and electronic mail address of 
the agent. 76 Significantly, as Professor Marshall Leaffer 
has written, "an OSP does not need to monitor its 
service or a.fftrmatively seek out information about 
copyright infringement on its service, except to accom-
modate technical measures described above.'m 
The importance of these provisions can hardly be 
overstated. They effectively codified the result of 
Religious Technology Center v. etcom On-Line 
Communications Services/ 11 which held that e rcom 
operator of a sener bulletin board, should not be 
held trictly liable for user infringement of which it had 
no knowledge. Moreover, under tl1ese provisions, 
compliance with fairly straightforward requirements can 
eliminate much of the uncertainty surrounding 
Internet-related copyright complaints; Libraries no 
longer need to guess what the law bas to say about 
how tl1ey ha ndle such complaints. On the other hand, 
should a library fail to take the simple step of designat-
ing and registering an agent with the Library of Con-
gress, it loses all of the protection provided by Title II 
of the OMCA. 
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5. Additional Provisions 
Finally, Title II provides for liability for knowingly, 
falsely claiming that material or activity is infringing,~ 
and protects OSPs from liability for ' good faith dis-
abling of access to, or removal of, material or activity 
claimed to be infringing or based on facts or circum-
stances from which infringing activity is apparent, 
regardless of whetl1er the material or activity is ulti-
mately determined to be infringing." ' 
C. Title IV - Sec. 404 - Exemption for libraries and 
arcluves 
With only one exception, the balance of the DMCA 
contains no provisions relevant to libraries. That 
exception is a small but important amendment to 
Section 108 of the copyright law, which, as noted 
above, provide special protections for libraries. As 
amended by the DMCA, qualifying libraries may now 
make three copies - instead of only one - of an unpub-
li hed work for pre ervation or for deposit for research 
usc by another Hbrary or archives .81 Libraries may make 
three copies of a published work that is "damaged, 
deteriorating, lost, or stolen, or if the existing format 
in which the work is stored has become obsolete," 
provided that the library has not been able to locate an 
unused replacement at "a fair price," and that if the 
new copies are in digital format, that they are not made 
available to the public in that format outside of the 
library.xz In this case, the DMCA not only increased the 
number of copies, but also added the language about 
obsolete formats , which the Act defines as being the 
ca e if "the machine or device necessary to render 
perceptible a work stored in that format is no longer 
manufactured or is no longer reasonably available in 
the commercial marketplace."8~ Finally, prior to passage 
of the DMCA, Section 108 provided that libraries could 
reproduce and distribute a single copy of a copyrighted 
work, provided that they met certain conditions, 
including placing appropriate copyright notice on the 
copy. This had led to the question of what libraries 
should do when the original work being copied had 
no copyright notice. The DMCA resolved that question 
by providing that in such a situation libraries should 
simply afftx a statement that tl1e work may be protected 
by copyright.84 
IV. CONCLUSION 
U.S. copyright law has traditional ly been very 
protective of the activities of libraries and librarians. 
The DMCA is no exception to this laudable trend. The 
Act expands the protections afforded libraries in 
Section 108, provides significant new protections for 
online activities, and offers important clarification for 
how complaints of online infringement are to be 
handled. Many of the protections of the DMCA, 
however, turn on compliance ·wi.tl1 quite technical 
lndi,wn I ilullrir<, /ntellutnnl Pmp<r(Y 
(altl10ugh seldom burdensome) requirements, such a 
the designation and registration of an agent to receive 
notices of alleged online infringement. In addition, 
the Act does create the potential of new liability for 
librarie especially for removing or altering CMI. E'en 
in the face of new liability however the Act refl cts tl1e 
law's longstanding olicitude for librarie by providing 
for reduced dan1ages . 
At present a number of the DMCA's provision are 
not applicable to many libraries because few libraries 
today act as OSPs. But this is certain to change a - more 
and more libraries expand d1eir Internet senrices. As 
tl1at happens attention to tl1e details of the DMCA "ill 
become increasingly important if libraries are to realize 
tl1e full protection of the law. 
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